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RESTRICTED 
OUTLOOK FOR WESTERN CIVILIZATION 
A lecture delivered by 
Dr. Bruce C. Hopper 
at the Naval War College 
March 30, 1950 
I have cherished so much the privilege of coming to the Naval 
War College. I feel like Paul among the Athenians-the Athen­
ians were always looking for some new thing. I think the Navy is 
that way too. Now I will try to bring out some new ideas here. 
What I want to bring out in the first place is time in terms of con­
trol of the time table, and not time as distinct from space in terms 
of civilization. 
It is hard to make revelations about Russia except to repeat 
constantly that . there is still darkness in Scythia. I find after 
having had six years away from academic life that what measure 
of retreat or withdrawal one gets in the academic circle somehow 
lengthens the perspective. It may be that the role of professor is 
just to find things that are overlooked by the experts. 
In my instance what I have been looking for is the some­
thing that America once had and has lost. The perspective turns 
to western civilization and there are several things which stand out 
in my mind. The first is that the Bolsheviks are still completely 
convinced that they can last longer than we can in this type of 
struggle. The second is that they still control the. time table. The 
third is that America's disunity is an aid and comfort to the Bol­
sheviks and the despair of our friends. And the fourth is that the 
Bolsheviks use time in their calculations as well as space. 
Doctor Hopper is Professor of International Relations at Harvard 
University and has written several books and articles on Russia. 
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Now I know that you have studied a great deal about poli­
tics and you will agree with me that timing is the master control 
in any program of politics. Time must not be overemphasized but 
one must think of time. Senator Dixon, one time governor of Mon­
tana, used to say that the strange thing is that you go on preparing 
and preparing and preparing for something called life, and then 
one day yqu awaken to realize that that for which you had been 
preparing has already passed you by. It may be that the dem­
ocracies, in facing Bolshevism, go on preparing for a type of strug-
gle that'ma:y never come off: A-bombs, H-bombs, bacteria-all 
that. The struggle might be rather, i� the Russian phrase, a 
"kto-kogo" ( ?) . Who beats who? Who can outlast the other? It 
may be an attrition not unlike that between the popes and the 
emperors for centuries in the Middle Ages. 
Obviously all you have to do is read the newspapers or talk 
to a Russian to realize that the Bolsheviks are much more confi­
dent than we are that they can outlast us. The reason is that it is 
much easier to chop down trees than to replant the forest. They 
are more time conscious. We are not time conscious. The Lord 
didn't give · us much patience here in America. We are a speed 
people---'-'get it done yesterday-and we want . what we want when 
we want it-but quick. Well, in playing chess with the Bolsheviks, 
that type of impatience may cost us the queen. 
I want to talk about time, always remembering that there 
is a tide in the affairs of men, etc. The totalitarians plan more. 
They are compelled to be more time conscious and yet it is surprising 
how much help they got from the outside in their effort to gain con­
trol of the time table. In the case of Hitler, for instance, you 
can see how the Communists in Germany helped put him in power. 
They allied with Hitler against the Weimar Republic. You can see 
how President Roosevelt helped insure Hitler in power by devaluing 
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the dollar and thus wi1>ed out 40% of the German debt in 1933, 
overnight; how the British gave favorable trade terms; how the 
Russians, instead of returning wheat as in the contract for the two 
billion . gold marks of machinery supplied by Weimar Germany, 
made the payment to Hitler in gold and in armament materials.. The 
. outside powers set it up for Hitler and then he went with machine 
gun staccato from one point to another after he _had got control of 
the time table about 1936, or even 1935. 
It was that chronic indecision of the democracies; that in­
ability to concentrate on the real enemy. Think of all the gun­
ning we did for Mussolini at that time. He could have been had. 
There were only a few rocks in the desert-:--a little something on 
his chest. He kept telling his people it is better to live one hour 
like a lion:than a.hundred years like a sheep. They didn't believe 
it. If we had given him a little something we could have kept him 
on our side of the fence and the war might have been different. 
But in World War II, by the deal with Hitler in August 
1939, the Bolsheviks collected loot until June 1941, and were in 
abeyance· until· October of 1944 when General Bor put on the up­
rising of Warsaw. Our intelligence people say that if they had 
kept on coming west the war might have been over the winter of 
1944 or 45. But no. The Red Army was diverted into the Danube 
to beat the British to Vienna and so. on. From th�n onward, as I
study the records, the Bolsheviks have controlled the time tables. 
· At Yalta they determined when they would enter the Pacific
war, for a price. They forced the second ceremony of surrender at 
Berlin (after the one at Reims). Thereafter they turned on the 
heat and turned it off again, forcing us to put the airlift on Berlin 
and deciding when it would cease, the heat on Iran� the heat cm 
China, etc., etc. Who controls the time table determines not .only 
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the order of events in general, but determines the rules, the prin­
ciples, . and the fashions of the period. To control the time table 
is to get into the driver's seat. 
Now I think that there are a number of requirements. I 
would like to cite ten selected areas in which America's indecision 
allows the Bolsheviks to keep control of the time table. If we are 
going to get control, we have to make up our minds about these 
particular areas. 
As St. Paul wrote to the Corinthians, "If the trumpet gives 
an uncertain sound, who shall prepare himself to battle?" Well, the 
answer is of course, no one. During the war, our trumpet had a 
very certain sound. Of course there was a unity of purpose which 
has since been squandered, and our danger as a nation is perhaps 
even greater now-greater in the long terms of history than it was 
when the submarines were at the gates, because this danger has to 
do with the rise and fall, not only of nations, but of civilization. 
And in the long attrition which I see ahead our shining new weapons 
may not even be taken out of their wraps. So long as the Bol­
sheviks control the time table, they determine the weapons. And 
they don't want a shooting war. 
So here are ten suggestions in areas where America is con­
spicuous for indecision. The first one: We must have a clear 
definition of our relations with the Bolsheviks, a definition upon 
which we will agree. Now what is it? It is not war and it certainly 
is not peace. But that is exactly what Trotsky said when he 
stomped home from the first part of the Brest-Litovsk peace con­
ference in January, 1918., He wouldn't sign anything with the Ger­
mans. He said, "No war, no peace," and ran back to Moscow. The 
old soldier, General Hoffman, was not impressed with that Bolshevik 
logic, so he ordered the German Army to unlimber the guns. And 
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it was then that Lenin decided there would be peace-at least on 
paper. Trotsky's formula of January 1918-no war, .no peace-was 
not implemented actually until 1945. That is what we are living 
under-no war, no peace. 
So how are we going to define this? I think we have to de­
fine it before we can get out of this trap of indecision. ,Suppose we 
call it tentatively-"War-in-Peace". Now that would 'raise a hue 
and cry, I know, but "cold war" is too passive a term. "Cold war'' 
doesn't denote the pressures: Acceptance of the phrase "War-in­
Peace" might change the psychology of the country and put us 
on the rails back to the unity of purpose which has been lost. 
Recently Dean Acheson came forth with a new phrase­
Total Diplomacy. Well, that's good. That denotes action at any 
rate, but how about something a little bit snappier than that? The 
phrase came to me in the middle of the night as they often do., I 
don't know whether you get up and write them down, but I have 
learned to do it, because they are gone in the morning. This phrase 
came to me-Jujitsu Diplomacy. That's a little spectacular I ad­
mit. The idea of jujitsu is to force the opponent to use his. own 
strength to break his own bones. That's exactly what the Bolshe­
viks do to us.. They use our own citizens - against us-freedom of 
speech, freedom of this anp that. In other words, they use Ameri-_ 
can privileges to destroy America. Dean Acheson's speech in _Cali­
fornia I think was a bit jujitsu. You know, Seven Pillars of Wis­
dom on how to make Bolshevik muscles go backward. That's 
what that speech meant. He knew it wouldn't accomplish anything, 
except a roar from Moscow, but it was a jujitsu tactic. So, .if we 
are forced to agree that peace is not around the corner, that a 
shooting war is not around the corner, I think it would be_ useful 
to accept a formula that would define the exact conditions, some-
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thing like a state of War-in-Peace .. We have no precedence and no 
rules for such a relationship. 
Last December I was out � Pittsburgh. One of the �hings· 
I wanted to see was that battlefield in Monogahela where General 
Braddock fought in 1755. It is all grown up with steel mills now. 
f reread Francis Parkman to get the story straight. Ge:geral Brad-
· dock was a very gallant soldier but· knew nothing about· Indians .
. There was shooting from· behind the trees. So he spoke to the Vir­
ginians, to George Washington. He said, "Stand out there and fight
like soldiers," and so on. Afterwards he said, "This isn't war. This
is murder." He lost his force, and he himself was wounded and died.
Now it seems to me that the democracies are doing what 
Braddock was doing, using the rules and principles of honorable 
war against the Indians in America. If we are going·to survive the 
long attrition, we have to get rid of the General Braddock notions. 
One of the first things to do is to decide on a definition of this 
struggle---e. g., War-in-Peace. 
Then a second decision. I thiiµt this is tearing us apart-· 
this loyalty, security-risk business. The Bolsheviks feel more and 
more copfident that all they have to do is wait while we blow our­
selves apart. · Students of history have seen all this happening be­
fore in Greece and in Rome. And we are seeing it happening to us 
�this indecision among the citizens on the question of loyalty and 
' 
. 
security. It is not a question of loyalty, actually. It is a qu�_stion 
of security risk at the policy level or for classified material. 
But in judging and in charging our citizens, I believe the issue 
is·the degree of.tolerance they show for the enemies of our society� 
internal and external. In their minds, they are completely loyal and 
they may even think they are good security· risks. Many of them 
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are frustrated intellectuals. They call themselves liberals-actually 
they are to liberalism what Hellenistic was to Hellenic-something 
pseudo, subsequent, and Easternized. Many find refuge in the aca­
demic profession and there they rest on their morals in a sort of 
detached intellectual neutrality., The label is given to those people 
I think, by the writer of Revelations: "Because thou art neither 
hot nor cold, but lukewarm, I will spew thee from my mouth." I 
think these people who are neutral in times of peril will be spewed 
from the mouth of history. Even the little peasants of Eastern 
Europe have a firmer grasp on history. They say that in times of 
crisis, either you sing with the angels or you will be forced to howl 
with the wolves. There is no happy middle ground. Now perhaps 
the Supreme Court will get us out of this trap. It is bad business 
and is getting worse. 
The third point of the area requmng decision: What is 
the political direction of our country? This is something that will 
have to go to a national decision. You and I are living with it. 
Economically it involves government spending-the danger of bank­
ruptcy. It includes academic folks and service people, and aHthose 
on fixed incomes and frozen salaries. We see what has been hap. 
pening in Europe. There has been a transfer of power since 1914 
from the middle class which ruled for over a hundred years. Power 
is transferred from the middle class to the industrial working class. 
The middle class is being disposessed by a war of taxes. 
This means in Europe, and will mean for us, more and more 
people shifted over to government employment, a swelling bureau� 
cracy-the bureaucracy then absorbing the intelligensia and taking 
on the mentality of trade unionism. The creative instinct then dies. 
Who then will bear the torch? There is a line in Virgil that. says, 
"Easy is the descent to Hell�" You can misquote Virgil a little bit 
by saying that easy is the descent to mediocrity. As Joseph Alsop 
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wrote, "Mediocrity begets mediocrity," whether by the crony sys­
tem or however else. 
When we stop putting quality into the individual, then we 
start making a mass man. In mass men the Bolsheviks are a long 
way ahead of us. I can say, as a historian, and I have spent most 
of my time studying history, when everyone is safe, then no one 
is free. As we move in that direction the time will come when our 
Statue of Liberty will drop the torch and merely hold a monkey 
wrench. Security-a monkey wrench! 
At any rate, if that process is abrupt then we will have too 
few moral leaders in the next generation. If it is gradual and spread 
over a number of decades, then perhaps we might train moral lead­
ers and be able to pass on to them the mantle so that the standards 
will not perish. That is really the great issue of the welfare state. 
And yet at night when you are alone you sometimes can hear 
Madame Lafarge with her knitting needles at the foot of the guil­
lotine. It can all happen again because the brutalization of western 
man is something that we can't measure in our times. 
Now the fourth question: What kind of Germany do we 
want? America has not made up her mind. There our trumpet 
has a very uncertain .sound. Some Americans say, "Let German 
bodies defend the Ruhr." Germany's historic role was in the North 
Sea, the.cradle of our democracy. Western Germany is now the key­
stone of the arch of a third power in defense of the Atlantic sea­
board. Much of our democracy came from German tribal sources. 
We can't have it both ways as I see it. Either we take western 
Germany into the western family and promote unification of all 
Germany, or we must be prepared to see the Germans accept the 
Bolshevik unification on the assumption that they, the Germans, in 
time can outwit the Russians. That is why I feel pained in reading 
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the "Times" this morning that they are not going to allow the 
Bonn government to have proper representation in the London 
meeting. I think it is wrong. I think we should override England 
-the Labor government at any rate-on such things. Our bigger
hope for Germany is a Franco-German rapprochment.
A friend of mine, just back from Paris, was telling me about 
the new 0. E. E. C. headquarters building which these governments 
themselves paid for and built on the grounds of the chateau that 
formerly belonged to the Rothschilds. They were confronted with 
a problem in bringing in the machinery. There was a beautiful line 
of trees there, Now the Bolshevik method would be to say, "To hell 
with the trees, get them out!' I must say that the American method 
would also tend in that direction. But these people did not think 
that way. They erected scaffolding and managed with a great deal 
of effort to bring in the machinery over the tops of the trees. They 
are very proud because that method signifies the spirit in this new 
Europe: preserve what is left of beauty and at the same time 
achieve something functional and streamlined. In that new Europe 
there is that essential keystone place for Germany. So what do we 
do? Do we throw Germany to the wolves or . do we. take her in ? 
The Germans would like to know and we have to make up our minds 
soon. 
The fifth area is somewhat similar: What do we do about 
Japan? Asia is, of course, in this process of rebirth and has been 
my main subject for study for twenty years. There will be five-year 
plans attempted around Asia. As these new states in the southern 
zone move forward in nationalism and independence, I rather expect 
to see a shift in diplomatic emphasis from Ea�tern Europe. We are 
going to be squeezed out there, and then we will shift our em­
phasis over to Southern Asia. 
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Now here is Japan-----0ur special problem! Japan had wQrked 
out her old solution with the material at hand-an economic solution� 
We stopped it and crushed Japan. So we have to provide something 
else or let Japan go the road of China. What are we 1oing to do? 
. Are we going to let Japan's industry recover based on a two-way 
exchang�raw materials, industrial products, etc. with Southeast 
Asia? · That would seem to be our policy. 
Le.t us terminate the state of war with Japan. We have more 
. ·control out there than we have in Europe. , Especially in General 
MacArthur we have a Pro-Consul on a heroic scale. I think we 
ought to bring him home and give him a Roman triumph to show 
him that his work will be perpetuated and get on with the job so 
that we can hold on to Japan .. That should be done soon. Here we 
do have master control. 
Now the sixth question, which is on a larger scale. Let us 
consider whether our crises today involves · Bolshevik expansion 
per se or old style Russian imperialism. The Russians in history 
have always absorbed their rulers. A number of times a ruler 
such as Peter the Great, or Alexan�er the First has made great 
effort to modernize the Russians. The process goes on for a while 
and then it lapses. ,Russianism re-emerges after· several decades. 
Is that going to happen this time? We have had three attempts at 
hegemony in Europe-in modern times I mean-French--Louis XIV, 
Napoleon; Teuton--Kaiser Wilhelm, and then Hitler� Now comes 
Veliki Ross led by the Bolsheviks'. We wilf have to determine 
whether this is a -racial thing or purely revolutionary Bolshevism. 
What will we be fighting in 20 years? Will it be a type of im­
perialism that is ·more Russian than Bolshevik? Or will the Bol­
sheviks by that time have taken over an· the satellites · and all of 
Asia, and confront us with a revolutionary imperialism. You must 
understand that this is a Bolshevik�hate-America campaign. It may 
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peter out. We don't know. All l know is that the Russians never 
had their day. One faseinating study is to try to discover in ad­
vance when they will bring in their brands. Will they revert to 
religious, reevangelization, given the freedom to do so? 
We can expect a Bolshevik claim for Alaska somewhere along 
· the line. They may make it for nuisance value. They'll simply say
thatthe corrupt Tzarist government officials sold Alaska, that it was
never legal, etc., etc., etc. They wouldn't expect to get it back of
course, Jbut just say it for nuisance value. That will come. So in
order to defeat the enemy in a cold or hot war,· we must differ from
them, not in degree but in kind, and understand whether they are
predominantly Russian, Communist, or Bolshevik.
Now the sev�nth question, and I appeal to you as war­
riors: Who are our :fighting Allies? Let us pick our Allies and 
give them of our substance and our vitality, and let the others 
fade .  Let us not permit the false ideas of our peace mongers to in­
terfere with this lasting decision in strategy. The :first thing that 
strikes us in thinking of Allies, is that our friends of yesteryear 
may be our foes of tomorrow. Two good examples are Czechoslo­
vakia and China. Conversely, people that we. fought may be our 
friends in -strategic bases ·tomorrow-Germany in the west, and 
Japan. 
Much depends on the ruling group at the time. Italy, for 
instance, was with us in the first World War and against us in 
the second. Turkey was against us. in the first, but preserved . a 
neutrality in our favor in the second. We must seek allies in terms 
of these shifting affinities, and then have one criterion. Yes, send 
supplies here and there, but consider would we go hunting tigers 
with the people in question? Would they climb trees when a tiger 
came? Let us have it simple and direct. If we would hunt tigers 
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with them, then let's build them up; Our friends include the na­
tions in the North Sea area in general, Western Germ�ny, and also 
Greece and Turkey. They are tiger hunters and so is Japan. The 
Japanese will defend their rice patties. I believe Franc�Spain wiU 
fight too. When our strategic thoughts will turn to Spain we will 
suddenly find that we haven't been so terribly hostile to Franco 
after all. His country will fit into the strategic picture. · There­
fore, who are our fighting Allies? Let's decide and hand out our 
favors accordingly. 
My eighth point concerns our principles. What are they 
to be in this type of struggle, this War-in-Peace. They· can't be 
haphazard. You in the Navy know that well. The first essential 
in regard to our principles is to know the enemy's principles. The 
outstanding principle of the Bolsheviks is continuous expansion 
without shooting wars. Their justification of that is their defin­
ition of popular sovereignty. For instance, they have sixteen union 
, republics; and they say that each one is sovereign and each is 
equal, at an international conference, to any foreign·· state. There­
fore it doesn't lose its popular sovereignty on becoming part of the 
glorious Soviet Union. Each Union Republic is considered sovereign 
because it has the constitutional right to withdraw. Of course, we 
· could prove the illusion of all that. However, this point I want to
make: By popular sovereignty the Bolsheviks have justified a sys­
tem of expansion which is without precedent in history.
We will not review the whole list of territories they have 
taken since 1939. You will see . how easy and wonderful it is for 
them, and h.,ow we have allowed it all to happen because we didn't 
contest them on this method of popular sovereignty. Start at 
this point: the frontiers. That is where popular sovereignty can be 
utilized. Note that in the various frontiers there is a tribal kin­
ship with the peoples outside the frontiers. This is utilized by the 
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Bolsheviks when it · comes to expansion. The first one that is of 
special interest to you in the Navy is the Norwegian frontier. Ex­
amine the Arctic coast, the Kola Peninsula to the Atlantic. In that 
area live the people of Anderson's fairy tales, the Lapps. I forget 
the exact number overall, but they exist in the Russian part, in 
.Sweden, and in Norway. In that area is the largest and most val­
uable notrhernmost port of the world, Narvik. If they controlled 
the Arctic coast, there wouldn't be that convoy trouble around 
North Cape again as in the last war. · A Lapps' Peoples Republic 
would unite the natives of that northern zone. They would probably 
even speak of a Lapp proletariat. They don't have to be consistent, 
you see, in putting this thing over. 
Another hot frontier with ·a .. similar tribal kinship present 
is down in Macedonia. I am not quite sure in my mind just what 
is a Macedonian. We know that some of them live in Greece, some 
in Yugoslavia and some in Bulgaria. I don't know whether there are 
any in Albania or not, but the Macedonian movement is always 
there. They do have a literary langu�ge of their own. So when 
the movement comes, when it is propitious for the Russians to put 
the heat on Macedonia, then they will operate out of Bulgaria. 
Another interesting area is in Turkey, U. S. S. R. because 
the Armenian questions people outside the frontier. Armenia, of 
course, in the 13th and 14th centuries was a very powerful state in 
the Near East, thus the memory of a glorious tradition. When 
the Russians get ready to put the heat on Turkey for control of 
the Straits, then a Greater Armenian Peoples Republic · is to be 
expected. It is a set-up. The same thing applies to Azerbaijan. The 
Azerbaijan people on the Soviet side and the Azerbaijan people on 
the Persian side are .of the same Turkish stock, neither Persian or 
Russian. The strength of this racial desire or racial coherence is 
again an instrument that the Bolsheviks could and would use when 
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they get ready to push for the Suez and India. Now note the 1 
relations of China with the old tributary states. Siam as well as 
Burma fall into a special category. Anything can happen there. 
Then in the course of twenty years with this Russian glacier com­
ing into the Bay of Bengal on the East and down to the Persian 
Gulf on the West, India would be in the pincers. That may be 
what we'll see before we ever get to a shooting war. 
So I say, that confronted with enemy principles in. opera� 
tion, we must have our principles of our aim; Let us see how far 
the immutable principles of war, so-called, could be applied to a prO'.­
longed attrition without shooting. 
First-Objective. The objective in this type of war I have 
described is to overcome the enemy's will.to expand through the use 
of popular sovereignty without shooting. That is what he wants­
to expand without shooting. Now we must.overcome his will. That 
is the objective. The second principle-,..,.Offensive. That means,,to 
contr.ol the time table. A direct idea of offensive is to control the 
time· table and take the initiative. Let us dwell on those two and 
leaving aside all the others-economy of·force,·movement, surprise, 
etc.,-except for logistics. 
My ninth requirement in this War-in-Peace is Logistics-­
what to do about matepal production, imports, exports, etc. Logis­
tics is a requirement and a principle. Effective ·preparations. and 
decisions must be made to determine the necessary amounts of 
supplies and man power to be utilized. 
The tenth point, and this is my clinchng thought in this 
development, is what interim strategy should we have at • this 
time in this War-in-Peace? I arrive at that by giving our in­
.terim strategy if we applied just the two first and most important 
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principles of war.. I would say that the principle of objectives is the 
restoration of the balance of power in Europe. That is our only way 
to get back to free wheeling. I don't want to go through the history 
of security, from unity to balance of power, to this collective idea, 
the universal type under the League of Nations and the U. N., and 
to the regional type that we are now working out in the North At­
lantic Treaty. 
I will say, as a student of history, that I believe that the 
only feasible method of the state system, as presently constituted, 
is balance of power. That is exactly what we are doing. I think we 
have no complaint to find with the State Department. By the poli­
tical means (the North Atlantic Alliance, plus the Franco-German 
rapprochment,) the economic means (the ECA) and the military 
means, this process is now going on. Military assistance to gov­
ernments of Europe would strengthen their hands against internal 
sabotage and destroy the illusion that an aggressor could have a 
quick campaign without much bloodshed, as the Germans believed 
in 1914 and again in 1939. Above all, while we are arming Europe, 
the most important objective is to deny the Atlantic seaboard to 
the Russian snorkels. German submarines in two wars came pretty 
close to pulling it off. Maybe next time the Russian snorkels, with 
German help, might be able to do it. At any rate, when that 
vacuum created by World War II is filled, and Western Europe in­
tegrated-at least in a military sense-then, with a Third Power 
in existence, the Balance of Power is restored. 
Now the second principle-the principle of offensive. I 
will try to give you something new which you can toss back at me. 
And I won't be able to defend it. I think that the offensive is 
just as necessary to victory in this type of War-in-Peace as it is in 
a shooting war. Some of you will recall that the French, at the 
time of the Battle of the Marne, retreated, dragging their guns 
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through the dust. For days they retreated, retreated, retreated. 
Finally came the order, "Stand on the hills, south of the Marne. 
Point your guns north and get ready to advance." Well, you might 
say a thrill went through that army. A psychological change came 
over the French after their retreat; retreat and then advance! That 
is what I want to see happen to our country. First we must take 
the offensive in this interim strategy (and it is only interim). 
The Russians stalk out of the U. N. Let them stay out. They 
need the U. N. Let us not forget it. We must not repeat the 
blunder we made during the war, assuming that they wanted a 
separate peace. That was a crowning blunder stemming, I believe, 
from the White House. Let them get the idea that the U. N. is 
pointed towards an alliance outside the Iron Curtain. But let us 
not make the mistake of saying that it is useless to _operate with­
out the Bolsheviks. As for the Chinese delegates who are the tar­
gets of their fire, if we throw Dr. Tsiang to the wolves we will de­
serve very small credit in history. Keep him on ice and give him 
some function until the Assembly meets in September, and then, 
who knows, we might be able to run him as a candidate and get a 
new Secretary General. It might be a good idea. That would be 
putting cockleburrs under the saddle of the Bolsheviks. That's 
what I call offensive.
Now the offensive we can take in regards to the atomic af­
fair. International inspection would mean the end of Bolshevism. 
What about those fifteen million or more slave laborers? They 
simply cannot allow foreigners to run around in Russia. So if we 
had their consent to inspection, it would be postponed. But we can 
do a lot amongst ourselves. We can at least unify the western 
allies on atomic policies. 
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Next come the offensive in regard to Germany. Let us 
terminate the state of war with all German people-not only West­
ern Germany, but Eastern Germany. It is not yet the time for 
making a peace treaty. The Bolsheviks may go in and perhaps an­
nex Eastern Germany. We have them in a box now. We can do 
a little jujitsu if we are clever enough. The Kremlin cannot unify 
Germany wi�hout making a fifth partition of Poland. That's our 
jujitsu. Let's get on with it. And immediately what shall we do? 
They talk about launching the youths of Eastern Germany into 
Berlin in May. Let's send General Clay back to Berlin. He's the 
idol of the German people. What are we doing with him now? 
Why, he-is lecturing at Harvard this week. There's a bigger job 
than that for him. Send him back there with any kind of cooked­
up mission just so he is there in Berlin, because he is a figure that 
the Germans trust. It would be a signal to them that we do not 
intend to get out of Berlin. Take the offensive. 
Go in and make an offensive in regard to this national com­
munism from outside the Iron Curtain-Yugoslavia, China, and 
the others. The State Department has a policy of erosion, I 
don't know exactly what it means but it sounds good. I would say 
that the offensive in the Far East should include the termina­
tion of the state of war in Japan and building up the economic 
answer to Japan through southeast Asia and eventually point to 
trade with China so as to get Japan off the taxpayers' neck here 
in America. These offensives must be multiplied, using all types 
-Point Four economic strategy, etc. My idea is that somewhere
along the line, after we get into the habit, we can take the of­
fensive. I don't mean at the drop of a hat, but to work it out in 
time. As long as we do not take the offensive we will never get 
· control of the time table. If we do take it somewhere along the
line while we are keeping our atoms d:ry, we will awaken one day
to find we have the stop watch and that we are calling the time.
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A long buildup is necessary because our people assume that 
an offensive is something wicked and practiced only by aggressors 
bent on a shooting war. That isn't true at all. An offensive is the 
only way that we can save ourselves from perishing through at­
trition and from crumbling within. As an example of our blunder­
ing zeal, I could quote the Nuremberg trials. We have got to"get 
as far. away from Nuremberg psychology as we possibly can. We 
have to adopt a technique we have never met before in history. In 
other words, we must call on God to help us. Everything was a liv­
ing contradiction in these trials, with the Russians being judges in 
their own cause and preventing the Katyn massacre from coming 
before the court. I won't cite it, but · I do hope that members of 
the college will take advantage of the opportunity to read about the· 
Katyn massacre in the report I am leaving here. 
Now there is just one more thought. As part of our offensive 
technique--our preservation of strength-let us keep our President 
at home. By that I mean that every time an American President 
has gone abroad, it has brought disaster on Western civilization. It 
looks as though the President goes into the camp of the Philistines 
and, like Samson, he gets his hair cut when he is asleep. You can 
see it in the case of President Wilson for instance. There he was 
with his Fourteen Points, the loftiest peace program ever devised 
by man. He was sitting pretty. Then ·came the armistice! All he 
had to do was to sit still and say, "Here we are., Make your terms 
and bring them over to me. I have the Army. I have the Navy. I 
have the money. So decide between yourselves and then let me 0. K. 
it." Something happened to him in November. I do not know 
whether Mrs. Wilson had a yen for Paris or not_. I do know that 
the· French Ambassador handed a memo to President Wilson pro­
posing· that the victorious Allies not negotiate with the vanquished 
powers, but decide among themselves the · terms and then call in 
the Germans merely to sign. That was contrary. to Wilson's prin-
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ciples of life. But he simply tossed the thing in his trunk. After 
all he was going to Paris, in spite of the fact that Colonel House 
said, "Don't Mr. President, don't come to Europe. Stay there in 
America."· He went to Paris. 
President Wilson landed in Brest and one description which 
I read in the French papers said that there hadn't been such a scene 
since Julius Caesar set out to conquer Britain in 54 B. C. From 
there he came to Paris. But did he follow Colonel House's in-
·, 
junction. to get on the American train, go to the American part 
of the front, speak to . the troops, then fall back to the balcony at 
the Embassy in Paris to receive the plaudits of the multitudes and 
then get back on the SS George Washington and go home? No! 
On the fourteenth of December, the crowd just choked the square 
from wall to wall. Here came the .Messiah from the west! And 
with Mrs. Wilson in that shining new automobile-well, it was 
more than the old Presbyterian could stand. He was just carried 
away and he stayed. He lingered there amongst the Philistines 
and began to get his hair cut. One by one his points went down 
the drain. And in the final analysis, he got his covenant hitched 
onto the treaty and he had to agree to all those thing&-the giv­
ing away of Shantung, etc., which caused the Senate to toss the 
whole thing out of the window. 
Looking back, we see that if President Wilson had only 
stayed at home and allowed the mountain to come to Mohammed, 
history would have been different. Who learned a lesson from 
that? Not President Roosevelt, because he used to go over and 
have.a·chat with Stalin without taking his long·spoon. Rememl>er? 
And so there has been one conference after another. We won't 
go into them. We will just say that there was disaster stemming 
from Yalta which will perhaps be with the human race for a cen­
tury. And then President Truman came to Potsdam. At least he 
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put his chop on things. The power of the President is so vast that 
we should not allow him to go on the front side of the Statue of 
Liberty. 
You read in the press, as we are reading now, about other 
Presidential trips. All these people, including even Senator Tyd­
ings who knows better, and Churchill, who knows better with his 
tongue in cheek, know it is all nonsense. We have had enough 
presidential haircuts to last us for a century. So I say keep the 
President at home as part of this new type of thinking. 
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